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1ABSTRACT
This article briefly explores how rural financial approaches have been evolving
over the past three decades as development paradigms shifted from large State intervention
to adjustment and liberalisation policies. Particular attention is given to the question about
how rural credit programmes can combine social objectives (high outreach) with financial
performance. To provide this analysis with an empirical foundation, the case of the Social
and Agricultural Programme (PSA)2 in Argentina is assessed. The study demonstrates that
PSA resulted in a high outreach level but low recovery rates. Based on the financial analy-
sis, recommendations are presented as the policy implications of the study.
                                                
2 PSA is the major national policy for the peasant sector in terms of coverage (beneficiaries and provinces),
budget and projects. Although there are studies on PSA, none of these focused deeply on its credit system.
11. INTRODUCTION
Over the past two decades, globalisation, the emergence of a new international
agro-food regime and world-wide liberalisation policies have drastically transformed Latin
American and Argentinean rural society. Structural changes in Argentina resulted in two
simultaneous and contradictory effects. On the one hand, there was an exceptional increase
in technological change, production and exportations. On the other hand, by looking at the
agrarian structure and social indicators, results show concentration of economic power,
worsening of distribution of wealth, hence an intensification of domestic inequalities and
weakening of the already precarious position of peasants3 (Maletta, 1995; Kay, 1994,
2000; Spoor, 2000; Lattuada, 2000).
Accompanying structural reforms, a significant change in the conception of rural
finance has taken place, shifting from subsidised agricultural credit towards more liberal
market-led approaches. In this process, two important responses to structural changes need
to be highlighted. First, in the field of rural finance, microfinance institutions (MFIs)
emerged and spread, aimed at targeting low-income farmers while at the same time trying
to pursue financial viability. Second, in the field of social policies, social funds (SFs) or
rural development programmes were implemented to offset the negative impact of struc-
tural adjustment policies among targeted groups of rural poor. 
It has been acknowledged that MFIs have specialised since the 1980s, providing
loans and savings services to those small farmers usually excluded from existing formal
financial services. They achieved high repayment rates and relative financial independence
(Hulme & Mosley, 1996; Coffey, 1998; Morduch, 1999 and Hulme, 2000). In addition,
every country in Latin America has implemented some kind of SF, targeting the extremely
poor (Cornia, 1999; Stewart & Van der Geest, 1995 and Glassner et al., 1994).
However, despite these efforts, two basic issues still remain under debate: (1) the
degree by which the rural poor really have access to financial services; and (2) the ability
of lending institutions to be sustainable. Apparently, the more rural finance institutions or
credit programmes focus on poverty alleviation, the more difficult it is to achieve financial
                                                
3 In this study the ‘peasant’ refers to the small farmer or minifundista who produces for both self-
consumption and local markets, engaging only workers in short seasons like the harvest. They have a pre-
carious land tenure situation, small-scale production (low capital and technology) and use intensively family
labour.
2viability. The higher the financial performance is expected, the more institutions tend to
‘exclude’ the poorest farmers. How to link these extremes is the core issue. The study of
PSA in this article therefore focuses around this debate and analyses the extent to which
PSA was able to combine outreach to peasants with financial performance4. 
This paper has three major parts. Section two briefly reports how different rural fi-
nancial perspectives were evolving during the ‘pre’ and ‘post’ adjustment era with regards
to the Latin American context. Sections three and four explore the case of PSA in Argen-
tina. This programme emerged in the 1990s as a SF, but adopted a typical credit policy of
the 1960s or 1970s, without learning from microfinance experiences; a case of putting old
wine in new bottles. For this reason, PSA is critically assessed by looking at it both as a
‘social fund’, as well as a ‘rural credit policy’. 
Concluding remarks show that PSA has succeeded in reaching the targeted popula-
tion. However, its main objectives as a social fund (to mitigate rural poverty) compelled
the programme to adopt a very inefficient subsidised credit policy. Welfare concerns were
prioritised at the cost of extremely low repayment rates resulting in the collapse of the ro-
tating fund. The policy implications of the study are built on the financial analysis.  As a
result, a set of successful microcredit practices is taken on board in order to improve PSA’s
current credit policy and financial performance.
2. CHANGING PARADIGMS ON RURAL FINANCE
For a long time, governments, international aid organisations, non-governmental
organisations (NGOs) and development banks have invested vast amounts of resources to
provide credit to peasants and commercial farmers in order to accelerate development.
Meanwhile, the question of how to best develop effective and efficient rural financial poli-
cies has been debated as development perspectives were changing. Since the 1950s, two
perspectives have crystallised from which two distinct financial policies have been devel-
oped (Ellis, 1996; Vogel & Adams, 1997 and Alvarado, 1996). 
                                                
4 ‘Outreach’ refers to the extent by which a programme provides financial services to a large number of
small (targeted) farmers. ‘Financial performance’ mainly refers to the ability of the programme to provide
durable services on a cost-recovery basis. See Yaron (1992a, 1992b), Christen et al. (1995), Rhyne (1998)
and Woller et al. (1999). 
3First, the period 1960s to the early 1980s can be explained by one development
model, where subsidised credit policies prevailed under a grater state involvement in the
economy. In this period, rural development programmes or special development banks
provided credit and technical assistance to small farmers in order to adopt ‘green revolu-
tion’ technologies and increase productivity. Also called the ‘productive’ approach, this
perspective underlies supervised or directed credit policies. 
For this perspective to emerge, it was assumed that the peasant sector (poor but
potentially productive) would improve their situation if they had access to credits under
‘soft’ contractual conditions (Aguilera, 1997). In this sense, a kind of ‘vicious circle’ of
poverty would be broken with rural credits (Rivas-Guerra, 1995 and Ellis, 1996:155). 
Consequently, rural credit emerged as an ‘instrument’ (in order to access seeds,
fertilisers, labour, technology, land, irrigation systems) aimed at reducing poverty by in-
creasing productivity and incomes (Braverman & Guash, 1986:1253). 
Despite good motivations, policies that emerged from this approach were sectoral
(i.e. limited to specific regions or groups) and have been unsuccessful, at least in the finan-
cial sense, since they lost an inordinate volume of capital with each passing year (Hulme &
Mosley, 1996:2). With the fiscal crisis, inflationary and debts problems during the 1980s,
this approach was seriously questioned. Fungibility problems, high transaction costs, lack
of saving services, low recovery rates, limited access of rural poor, and dependency in
government resources, constituted the main causes for its decay (Braverman & Guasch,
1986:1256-7 and Ellis 1996:162-3).
Based on a complete break with the previous paradigm and stimulated by the adop-
tion of liberalisation policies since the 1980s, a new perspective on rural finance emerged;
the ‘financial market’ approach. Subsidised credit evolved into rural finance, encompass-
ing the financing of both farming and rural non-farm activities, as well as integrating the
issue of local savings mobilisation. Market interest rates increasingly prevailed, loans be-
came demand driven and institutions were evaluated on a cost-recovery basis. There was a
tendency to reduce State intervention by allowing financial markets to play the most domi-
nant role (Hulme & Mosley, 1996; Braverman & Guash, 1986:1254 and Rivas-Guerra,
1995).
4At least two main problems of this perspective have to be stressed. First, although
credit and saving services were very important, they had limitations to (1) increase pro-
ductive capacity, (2) adopt technologies and develop new skills, (3) start up new activities
(employment generation) and (4) reduce poverty (Hulme & Mosley, 1996; Dawson &
Jeans, 1997:6 and Berger, 1989). Secondly, the pressure on institutions to be efficient and
sustainable resulted in a shift from productive initiatives to commercial, processing and
consumption loans. Additionally, there was a tendency to select low-risk activities and
more viable farmers (Dawson & Jeans, 1997:7-8), as well as a preference for smaller short-
term loans (Otero, 1997:29). In many cases policies resulting from this approach failed to
reach the poor. 
Despite these two major streams (‘productive’ and ‘financial market’ approaches),
it has to be emphasised that after structural adjustment programmes, different perspectives
were experienced and are still debated. 
As a response to liberalisation policies and the withdrawal of the state, a first gen-
eration of MFIs emerged. Also called microcredit institutions (MCIs), they evolved in
many legal forms, such as NGOs (some transformed into regulated institutions), credit
unions, co-operatives, commercial banks and in combination with State-led programmes.
They received the label of ‘micro’ due to the small size of their transactions and savings
deposits, and ‘finance’ because they were aimed at providing safe and reliable financial
services to the poor (Microfinance Gateway Library, 2001).
MFIs shared several features with the financial market approach. They attempted to
spread the financial market sector, including a broad range of services (e.g. credit, savings
and insurance). They also persisted in high repayment results, positive interest rates and
the intention of building up sustainable institutions. Since the middle 1980s several MFIs
like BancoSol in Bolivia, K-Rep in Kenya, BRI in Indonesia and Grameen Bank -now in 66
countries (Grameen Bank, 2001)- emerged and expanded in developing countries.
These policies were positively evaluated in terms of beneficiaries and the high re-
covery rates they got (Dawson & Jeans, 1997 and Chavez, 1997:102-9). However, also
negative results have to be mentioned. First, the precondition for institutions to be sustain-
able generated a tendency to select the ‘best’ borrowers, consequently, excluding those
‘non-viable’ producers or more risky crops (Morduch, 1999:1598-601; Hulme, 2000:26-8
5and Galarza & Alvarado, 2001:20-1). Second, credit was still too scarce and saving facili-
ties very limited to play a stronger role in development (United Nation Secretariat, 1998:5;
Coffey, 1998). Third, although MFIs achieved high levels of repayment, only 5 per cent of
world-wide institutions are financially sustainable (Morduch, 1999:1587 and Hulme &
Mosley, 1996:8). 
Since the late 1990s and based on the problems of MFIs mentioned above, a second
generation of MFIs (also called ‘innovative financial institutions’) seems to be emerging
(Hulme & Mosley, 1996:10). In this approach, a re-regulation of financial services is be-
lieved to contribute at re-conciliating efficiency objectives with welfare concerns; or pro-
ductive and re-distributive impact with financial sustainability (Seibel, 1998 and Lapenu,
2000).
Spite some positive experiences, one could ask: is there a ‘real’ second generation
of MFIs, which reach the poorest of the poor and achieve financial sustainability? Is mi-
crofinance a single path or a mixture between two divergent ends: namely, poverty reduc-
tion and the development of a healthy microfinance sector? 
In fact, beyond different approaches and actors involved (donors and internationals
institutions, researchers and policy makers, NGOs, MCIs and peasant organisations) there
seems to be a permanent debate between two historical streams. On the one hand, the ‘in-
stitutionalists’, who emphasise on the spread of financial institutions, professionalisation,
sustainability and profitability, prioritising financial performance over depth of outreach
(Otero & Rheyne, 1994). On the other hand, the ‘welfarists’, who focus on direct poverty
alleviation, even at the cost of low recovery rates (Woller et al., 1999:1). This debate is
very relevant for the analysis of state-led rural development programmes, designed as tar-
geted policies to mitigate rural poor in a context of structural changes and increasing pov-
erty. 
For the PSA’s case, both outreach level and financial performance are considered
important objectives (PSA, 2001:15-19). The first objective fulfils government expecta-
tions as regards a social policy; the second is a pre-condition for sustainability which al-
lows for an expansion of coverage. 
Given these concerns, it is worth asking: Is PSA an expression of the second gen-
eration on MFIs? Has PSA, in fact, reached poor peasants and, at the same time, achieved
6financial sustainability?  Or, on the contrary, has the programme simply wrapped old-style
subsidised credit policies in an innovative social fund framework? Is this just a case of ‘old
wine in new bottles?’
3. THE CASE OF THE SOCIAL AND AGRICULTURAL PROGRAMME IN
ARGENTINA
3.1 The Context for the PSA to Emerge
It is necessary to briefly situate the study of this state-led rural credit programme in
the context of the dramatic structural changes that took place in the region since liberalisa-
tion policies were adopted. This reforming scenario and its impact on the Argentinean rural
structure constitute key inputs for analysis of PSA.
Undoubtedly, structural adjustment policies, the adoption of an export-oriented de-
velopment strategy and the internationalisation of agriculture through the intervention of
transnational corporations and agribusiness have accelerated the modernisation of sub-
sectors of agriculture and transformed social actors and their relationships in the rural soci-
ety. 
Argentina shares with other countries in Latin America almost the same trends,
where a dualistic process has taken place. On the one hand, between 1990-1998, the evo-
lution of the agricultural sector in terms of new technologies and increase of production
and exportation has been exceptional. The country has had continued and positive rates of
agricultural growth, maintaining the contribution of the primary and agro-industrial sector
at around 30 per cent of the GNP. For example, between 1992-1997, the production of ce-
reals and oilseeds in the Pampas increased 33.2 per cent and the productivity went up 7 per
cent (Lattuada, 2000:2-6). On the other hand, the participation of the peasantry in the
economy decreased, open competition produced unequal growth (some regions became
more viable than others) and rural poverty increased (Maletta, 1995:144 and Hicks, 2000).
The peasant sector and capitalised family producers are vanishing as a consequence
of globalisation, deregulation and the involvement of Argentina in MERCOSUR. The inte-
gration with Brazil is pushing agricultural producers towards more profitable export crops
(reconversión). In this process, small farmers face many difficulties in adjusting to the new
patterns as they have serious limitations regarding land and technology or access to capital
7and credit (Manzanal, 1999). Only the fertile Pampas export sector (cereals, oilseeds and
beef) and, to some extent, other middle-size farmers with regional productions (wines and
fruit) could catch up with the conditions imposed by the new agro-food regime, while the
rest became ‘non-competitive’ or ‘non-viable’ farmers (Paz, 1999). 
Structural reforms have accelerated the process of ‘depeasantisation’ and ‘prole-
tarianisation’. The number of agricultural units of production decreased considerably since
1988, where -according to the agricultural census (INDEC, 1988)- the number of peasant
households was around 200,000 units. The census was not implemented again, but ac-
cording to Manzanal (2000), who estimated the peasant population on the basis of secon-
dary data from different local and regional studies (Forni & Neiman, 1994; Murmis, 1995
and Tsakoumagkos, 1997), by 1999 the number of minifundistas hardly exceeded 150,000
households5.
In response to the negative impact of structural adjustment and following World
Bank recommendations, Argentina has implemented different social funds (SFs)6 to offset
the social costs of liberalisation policies and alleviate rural poverty. By targeting different
‘types’ of producers and rural poor (minifundistas, women, children and rural proletariats)
the government has designed different strategies, including the provision of subsidised
credits, rural extension services and marketing support. PSA has emerged as a SF and a
rural credit programme within this context. 
                                                
5 Other sources testify to this trend. In La Pampa, one Argentinean province, the milk sector increased its
production between 1991-1997, but during the same period the number of producers decreased by 50 per cent
and almost all small producers disappeared (Lattuada, 2000:18). In Tucumán, another Argentinean province,
between 1988-1996 the number of sugar-cane minifundistas  (cañeros) decreased by 31.5 per cent and their
proportion of temporary off-farm labour greatly increased (Giarraca et al., 1999:3-7).
6 Social funds were designed as mechanisms through which resources could be allocated according to a pre-
determined selection criteria, to demand driven sub-projects proposed by public, private or voluntary (formal
or informal) organisations (Carvalho, 1994:1). They started as temporary anti-cyclical programmes but, as
the economic stagnation persisted, they became semi-permanent or permanent policies, shifting from ‘com-
pensatory’ (Social Emergency Funds) to ‘promotive’ measures (Social Investment Funds) (Cornia, 1999:12
and Tendler & Serrano, 1999:13). These ‘social policies’ shared practically the same features: targeting
mechanisms (to obtain a high impact per capita); important degree of administrative autonomy, decentralised
and privatised delivery of services; demand-driven schemes based on participatory projects, and external
financial support.
83.2 PSA Revisited: Institutional Profile and Beneficiaries
As a common trend, the peasant sector7 in Argentina has not received loans from
either the public or private banks. For them, the main sources of ‘financial’ support have
been the national and provincial welfare State (until the 1980s), targeted programmes
(since the late 1980s), local or regional NGOs and the informal sector (Manzanal, 2000 and
SAGPyA, 2000).  
PSA started at the end of 1993 as a targeted programme for peasants. Depending on
the National Agricultural Ministry and currently running, it is the major state-led rural
policy for peasants in terms of budget, and the first one to cover 21 provinces (Manzanal,
2000). Between 1993-2000, PSA has transferred to the peasant sector $30.6 million in
credit. It has assisted 38,121 households (almost 24 per cent of Argentinean peasant popu-
lation) that participated in 5,892 projects, providing basically credit, training, technical as-
sistance and marketing support (ProgPSA, 2001).
Although credit has been the major attraction for its beneficiaries, PSA is presented
as a rural development programme. Two main objectives are explicitly defined: (1) to con-
tribute to the increase of peasant household incomes; and (2) to promote the participation
and social organisation of the peasant sector in decision-making processes over policies
and programmes (PSA, 1994). 
3.2.1 PSA as a Social Fund
PSA has adopted the neoliberal ‘style’ of social policies and shares the typical prin-
ciples of SFs implemented in the 1990s (targeting strategy, decentralisation, participatory
schemes, and well-qualified staff).
This programme deliberately attempts to reach peasants by targeting them as direct
beneficiaries. The target population are small farmers (campesinos or minifundistas), and
                                                
7 In Argentina the peasant sector never had the same relevance as it has had in Bolivia, Mexico or Perú,
mainly due to its geographical heterogeneity. Argentina has five large and different regions: the Northwest,
Northeast, Cuyo, Patagonia and the Pampas. The Pampas has the most fertile and well-watered grasslands,
while the Interior (the other four regions) has worse conditions regarding soil quality and seasonal patterns of
rainfalls. The dominant role given to the Pampas for Argentina to integrate socially and economically into
the world order, has historically neglected the peasant and the Interior realities (Manzanal, 1990:137-8 and
Sawers, 1996:26-7).
9the ‘eligibility’ criteria are defined with very clear and strict parameters of capital, work
and income (PSA, 1994, 1998a).
PSA also adopted a very decentralised structure. At national level the Agricultural
Ministry administrates the programme. At the provincial level, Provincial Units (integrated
by public and private local institutions as well as two peasant representatives), are in
charge of evaluating productive projects and demands for loans, as well as articulating the
programme with other local policies for the sector. 
Peasant participation is also encouraged at different levels. PSA adopted a de-
mand-driven scheme, in which potential beneficiaries design productive projects formu-
lated by groups. Beneficiaries are supported by rural extension workers, who assist them in
organising the group, formulating the project and -once the project is approved- providing
technical assistance during field visits and group meetings. PSA also encourages benefici-
aries to participate in entities like Provincial Units and meetings at local, regional and na-
tional levels, where they contribute to decision-making processes (PSA, 1994, 1998b).
As other SFs in Argentina that emerged as temporary institutional programmes,
PSA has not really been institutionalised, that is, there is no law that determines its exis-
tence as a permanent service for peasants.  Despite its high degree of administrative and
technical autonomy, PSA depends on budgets that are yearly defined and approved by the
national parliament. 
3.2.2 PSA as a Credit Policy
PSA emerged in the 1990s, at the time when microfinance perspectives had spread
world-wide. According to its institutional structure, objectives, policy instruments and
methodology, it mainly presents the characteristics of the ‘productive approach’ on rural
finance, in which subsidised credit is considered a means to increase productivity and in-
comes. PSA credit policy is aimed at ‘[...] mitigating rural poverty by increasing productivity
and improving the marketing of agricultural activities developed by minifundistas throughout
their association in small enterprises (EPAs)’ (PSA, 1998a). 
Although rural credit is very important (an average of 50 per cent of PSA’s expen-
diture), it is provided within a package of other non-financial fully-subsidised services: (1)
technical assistance, (2) training; and (3) marketing support. The provision of this ‘pack
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age’ of services is oriented to fulfil government expectations, mainly defined in terms of
social impact: higher incomes, more self-employment, and less rural-urban migration. This
puts PSA closer to the ‘welfarist’ approach, and consequently shapes its methodology. 
The programme has designed three lines of credits to support different types of ac-
tivities. First, consumptive projects (autoconsumos), subsidies lower than $200 to be ‘re-
paid’ in kind by delivering part of production to community institutions. It represented
12.4 per cent of total funds for credit transferred between 1993-2000, reaching 45.6 per
cent of the total number of beneficiaries, and had an average ‘loan’ size per household of
$160. Second, credit for traditional crops and lower risk activities (proyectos tradiciona-
les). This represented 80.4 per cent of the total credit delivered and reached 50 per cent of
households. Third, credits for innovative or experimental activities (proyectos innova-
dores), which involved 7.2 per cent of total credit and reached 4.4 per cent of households.
The maximum loan size per family is $1200 and the average was $ 692 per household. The
group membership was on average 6.5 farmers per project, just more than the minimum
determined by PSA regulations (PSA 1998b and ProgPSA, 2001). 
PSA can be also characterised as a ‘directed credit scheme’. Credit is seen as an in-
strument to increase agricultural capital and productivity. It is directed towards supporting
certain agricultural investments in both capital assets and working capital; including a
‘negative’ list, where prohibitions on the use of loans (for example, land and wages) are
stated  (PSA, 1998a). 
Conditions to access credits also characterise PSA as a ‘directed’ approach, since it
defines many specific requirements. First, producers have to join a group, formulate an as-
sociative project and establish their organisational regulations (group lending methodol-
ogy). Second, they must stipulate the use of the credit (as detailed as possible), present a
recommendation letter signed by a local authority who supports the group and add a tech-
nical assistance plan aimed at introducing technologies and supporting the associative
work (PSA, 1994, 1998a). 
PSA´s credit policy also represents a ‘supervised’ scheme, in which beneficiaries
must demonstrate that they used the credit correctly. In addition, they are ‘obliged’ to par-
ticipate in technical assistance activities to reduce project-failure risks (PSA, 1994, 1998a). 
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As many other state-led credit policies, PSA defined very ‘soft’ conditions. It
adopted a ‘subsidised’ interest rate of 6 per cent per year (for traditional activities) and 4
per cent (for innovative or experimental crops). Conditions of repayment are generally de-
fined for long periods (between 1 to 7 years), and special concessions (rescheduling and
debt forgiveness) for extremely poor groups or very risky projects are taken into account. 
PSA has regulations for cases of default, but -in practice- none of these mecha-
nisms have been applied, mainly because staff did not believe that they would achieve their
objectives.  For instance, it was thought that increasing interest rates –for overdue loans-
would lead to falling repayment rates rather than acting as an incentive to compliant be-
haviour.  In addition, the follow up of credits through legal enforcement would be seen as
contravening the ‘principles’ of a social programme aimed at reducing rural poverty
(Martinez-N., 1996 and Benencia, 1997.  
Although financial performance was not an initial priority, PSA designed a ‘rotat-
ing’ fund to deposit repayments and support new credits. It is operated by the central ad-
ministration, who sends funds to provinces through the same procedures used for budget
funds. PSA regulations state that loans recovered in each province can only be used to
support new credits in the same province. However, in some cases (caused by budget con-
straints) rotating funds were delivered to support other activities such as technical assis-
tance or administrative costs. 
4. PSA EVALUATED: LESSONS FROM THE FIELD
In this section, the programme is assessed in terms of its ability to combine welfare
concerns with financial sustainability. This analysis is made by looking at both social and
productive results (PSA as a SF) and financial performance (PSA as a credit policy). 
The analysis of social impacts has some difficulties, since the outputs have varied
according to (1) the Argentinean macro-economic context, (2) the particular local and re-
gional agricultural crisis, and (3) the different ways by which PSA was applied in each
province. Despite these limitations the analysis was made based on previous studies8 and
available secondary information. 
                                                
8 See, Martinez-N (1996), Benencia (1997), PSA (1998a), Manzanal (2000), Rodriguez-B (2000) and Allub
(2000). 
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4.1 Social and Productive Results of PSA as a Social Fund
Undoubtedly, social concerns in the early 1990s in Argentina, like the negative im-
pact of the debt crisis and structural adjustment policies, have shaped PSA as a policy ori-
ented towards reducing rural poverty. The financial performance (basically repayment and
default rates) has been a secondary preoccupation for PSA. The programme has empha-
sised the number of beneficiaries and groups, level of social organisation and marketing
activities, and the ways by which credit increases production, number and type of animals,
access to inputs and adoption of technology, i.e. the ‘productive’ approach. In this sense,
PSA had positive results, taking on a crucial role in providing credit to the peasant sector,
as it is shown below.
With respect to targeting, PSA data show a high outreach level, since more than 86
per cent of the recipients of credit were within the selected population (Martinez-N., 1996
and Benencia, 1997). Contrary to tendencies in the implementation of targeted SFs (Cornia
& Stewart, 1995), PSA obtained a low level of both ‘F-mistakes’ (failures in reaching the
targeted population) and ‘E-mistakes’ (leakage to non-targeted farmers). In addition, for
more than 90 per cent of beneficiaries, it was the first opportunity to access credit and
technical assistance (Martinez-N., 1996). 
Field studies of SFs generally argue that targeting mechanisms generate psycho-
logical costs like ‘paternalist’ segregation, stigmatisation or deterioration of self-esteem
(Sen, 1995:13). A recent qualitative study of PSA (Rodriguez-B, 2000) analysed the inci-
dence of targeting on social capital and local peasant networks. Conclusions show that
PSA, far from producing segregation or stigmatisation, has been seen by beneficiaries as a
chance for empowering their local organisation and acquiring recognition as citizen and
economic actors. Targeting did not ‘break’ previous friendship networks, even in cases
where some member of existing groups were not targeted by PSA.
In relation to participation and decentralisation, both Manzanal (2000) and
Martinez-N. (1996) concluded that PSA succeeded in ‘opening’ spaces for the peasants to
participate. Small farmers participate in activities regarding project management and deci-
sion-making processes at local and regional levels. The extension of PSA, despite budget
constraints, is a response more to pressure on national authorities made by beneficiaries
than government priorities for the sector. Moreover, the decentralised scheme facilitated
13
the articulation of PSA with other actors (local government and institutions, peasant or-
ganisations and donors) and contributed to partially mitigating the lack of resources (na-
tional budget and rotating fund). 
In relation with the analysis of the productive, technological and economic results
of PSA, some works9 conclude that, in general terms, credit, technical assistance and spe-
cial training provided by PSA allowed most of the projects to reach their objectives, in
terms of (1) improvement of quantity and quality of production; (2) adoption of new tech-
nologies and skills; (3) increase in households assets; and (4) participation in associative
schemes for producing and marketing (lowering costs, producing value-added and in-
creasing incomes).
However, at the macro level, PSA presents several limitations and weaknesses
(Manzanal, 2000:93-6). First, there are no national, regional or local complementary poli-
cies to overcome the problems that the ‘market’ causes to the peasant sector after liberali-
sation policies. Second, the volume of credit ($1200 maximum per household) and the
technical assistance provided through PSA is insufficient for small farmers to become
competitive given the magnitude of structural poverty. Finally, more than 74 per cent of
the peasant population in Argentina still lacks access either to PSA or to other social sup-
ports. As a consequence, what the peasant sector has lost through structural adjustment, in
terms of the loss of production subsidies and cutbacks to health, educational and social
policies, is far greater than the benefits received from PSA.
4.2 PSA’s Credit Policy, Financial Performance and Sustainability 
Many of the strengths and weaknesses of the credit policy adopted by PSA match
the problems documented within the ‘productive’ approach (directed and subsidised credit
schemes) that was popular in the 1960s and 1970s. Most of the positive results are those
already mentioned above, such as high outreach to the target population; satisfaction of
                                                
9 This analysis is a difficult task. The influence of macro economic variables on the agricultural sector makes
it very difficult to calculate the manner by which a micro project might have contributed (or not) to mitigat-
ing recession and trends of impoverishment. Additionally, there is no sufficient statistical data (at the starting
point and after policy implementation) to demonstrate results in terms of incomes, employment generation or
other quantitative variables. Nevertheless, it is possible -at least- to present the most relevant conclusions
regarding project results, based on previous qualitative studies. See Martinez-N. (1996), Benencia (1997),
Rodriguez-B. (2000), SAGPyA (2000), Allub (2000) and Manzanal (2000).
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productive needs and the solution of technical problems; and more participation and social
organisation. In the following paragraphs, the analysis focuses on the negative results of
PSA’s credit policy. 
4.2.1 Procedures, Conditions to Access Credit and Peasant Participation 
PSA is considered as one of the most efficient SFs in Argentina (Martinez-N,
1996); however, it has very bureaucratic and complicated procedures. As mentioned above,
many ‘steps’ have to be taken to access credit. These conditions are not in balance with the
real monetary transfer towards the sector and they give rise to problems such as delivery
delays; projects formulated without real participation, resulting on non-appropriate invest-
ments; and high increase in transactional and administrative costs (Benencia, 1997). 
Although PSA adopted a decentralised scheme, conditions to access credit were
almost the same for the whole country, without recognising diverse agricultural systems
and regional realities. In provinces with very low rural population densities, strict associa-
tive conditions resulted in ad hoc groups created solely for the purpose of accessing funds.
It resulted in many badly functioning groups, which frequently made all borrowers default
when one member failed to repay (Benencia, 1997 and Martinez-N, 1996). For these cases,
individual treatment would have been more effective. 
In addition, the ‘positive list’ that determines which type of investment can be ob-
tained with loans, does not include certain assets (e.g. land) that in some cases might con-
tribute to solving structural conditions of poverty. As a consequence, according to internal
evaluative reports, PSA had problems of loan fungibility. Moreover, in some cases, credit
ceilings were not sufficient to acquire the most appropriate technology for the agricultural
system. These conditions sometimes had negative impacts on productive outcomes, re-
sulting in recovery failures. 
Furthermore, contrary to the official PSA policy, the beneficiary’s real participation
in the management of the rotating fund has been limited, since funds were administrated
from the Central Unit. According to Cerviño (1999) it badly affected loan recovery, since
peasants felt that this fund would never be available in their own province. It also increases
transaction costs, including deposits and transfers from provinces to the Central Unit and
vice versa.
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Finally, the database for credit monitoring (ProgPSA) is not ‘friendly’ and its op-
eration is quite complicated. As many provincial co-ordinators have stated (PSA, 1996),
peasants do not understand and trust in what the system reports, since in many instances
the database generated confusions about interest rates and other amounts to be paid. Con-
sequently, institutional trust was deteriorated.
4.2.2 Financial Performance 
The financial performance has been a secondary preoccupation for PSA, at least
until early 1998, when the increasing demand for credit was not satisfied due to budget re-
ductions and the insolvency of the ‘rotating-fund’. Its institutional profile (‘soft’ condi-
tions, inappropriate legal framework and instruments, and unsuccessful coercive actions)
has contributed to a low financial performance. PSA has high default rates and its credit
system is absolutely unsustainable, either in terms of operational sustainability (ability to
cover operating costs) or financial sustainability (full dependence on external support,
mainly the national PSA budget). 
To demonstrate this, two steps will be followed. First, by examining PSA expendi-
ture per type of services as a percentage of the total budget per year, the analysis focuses
on institutional priorities and trends regarding credit relevance on the programme scheme.
Second, by looking at four complementary basic indicators regarding financial systems,
real performance is shown more clearly.
- Credit Relevance in PSA’s Expenditure
Figure 1 compares four basic types of PSA’s expenditure: (1) Loans, monetary
transference delivery through traditional and innovative projects to be repaid in cash; (2)
Subsidies, monetary transference for self-consumption projects to be repaid in kind; (3)
Extension services, including technical assistance, training for beneficiaries and staff, so-
cial organisation and marketing support; and (4) Total costs, involving administrative and
transaction costs for extension services, credit and subsidy delivery. Regarding Figure 1,
three important tendencies in relation to PSA’s institutional profile should be pointed out.
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irst, it demonstrates that the credit system has been steadily deteriorated, making
come a programme which provides basically technical assistance, training and
g support. PSA started in late 1993, but the real starting point was 1994, when
livery rocketed to $8.8 million (29 per cent of total PSA credit delivery between
00). Since 1994 loan delivery was decreasing in absolute and relative terms, except
 1997-1998 where a light budget increase and the complete use of the rotating fund
to moderately respond to high demand. Important for the analysis is the manner in
e share of extension services has steadily increased, reaching almost 70 per cent of
enditures in 2000, while credit delivery, which was decreasing, scarcely repre-
0 per cent in that year. There are at least three reasons for this result: (1) successive
ns of the PSA budget; (2) low loan recovery rates and consequently lack of re-
for credits in the rotating fund; and (3), the institutional profile, which determines
nical assistance is provided for three consecutive years after delivering the credit.
al assistance tends to grow faster than credit expenditure.
econd, it shows that subsidies were not very significant as compared to total ex-
es. However, they were important in terms of coverage, representing 45.6 per cent
tal number of beneficiaries reached by PSA (PSARen, 2001). Moreover, subsidies
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have taken almost the same value as a percentage of total expenditure per year, even in the
periods 1994-1996 and 1998-2000 where loan delivery dropped substantially. In this sense,
PSA managed to keep reaching a significant number of peasants within the existing budget
constraints. Although this is crucial for a social policy to maintain political support, it ad-
versely affected the rotating fund, since the provision of subsidies allows for in kind re-
payments.
Third, the data show a relative increase in administrative costs as the total volume
of loan decreases. Even when recognising that PSA total costs are high in relation to mi-
crocredit standards, since it includes the extension service costs, what is important here is
the evidence that they move in an opposite direction to credit volume. Thus, with budget
constraints and a low percentage of loan expenditure, total costs tend to be proportionally
higher, damaging financial performance.
- Loan Recovery and Default Rates
Figure 2 shows the overall tendencies and crucial problems of PSA’s financial per-
formance. For the analysis, the data were adjusted and organised according to four indica-
tors, conceptualised as follows: First, the default rate, defined and calculated by PSA
(ProgPSA database) as the value of overdue loans in one year, divided by the current port-
folio. There is a problem however with this indicator; when the portfolio increases reported
default rates tend to be lower than real rates. Subsequently, a second indicator had to be
created to show the real financial performance, the real default rate. In this case, by re-
placing the denominator with the size of the portfolio at the time that those loans were
made, the real default rate was obtained. Additionally, a third indicator was used, the re-
payment rate, calculated by dividing loan volume recovered per year by scheduled repay-
ments plus interests in this year. Since many loans repaid in one year may be long overdue,
this indicator does not show the real ability of PSA to recover loans at the time they should
be re-paid. Consequently, the real repayment rate10 (complement of real default rate) was
used to prove how effective the programme is in recovering loans.
                                                
10 In this study, the incidence of inflation and credit interest rate on the nominal recovery rate is not calcu-
lated, since the low inflation rates (an average of 4 per cent per year between 1994-2000) will not influence
the extremely low recovery rate trend experienced by PSA, as showed in figure 2. 
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Default rates and real default rates have been steadily increasing since 1994. The
default rate expressed by PSA hides the real problem of default, at least between 1993-
1997 when the availability of funds to support new credits was still high. However, the real
default rate testifies that since the very beginning (1994 with 20 per cent) until now (with
almost 80 per cent) repayment default damaged the credit scheme. 
By looking at the ability of PSA to recover loans the same problems are observed.
In PSA, as the history of subsidised credits shows (See Braverman & Guasch, 1996:1256),
recovery rates were high at the beginning in 1994, but steadily declined over the pro-
gramme’s life until 2000. Although both repayment rate curves move practically together,
the difference between them shows that not only PSA lacks the ability to recover credits
but also when it does, it is much later than it should. In addition, rescheduling and debt
forgiveness, as well as loans declared impossible to recover, which represent 12 per cent of
the portfolio ($ 3.7 millions), are hiding the lack of ability to recover loans.
4.2.3 Why Such Low Loan Recovery Rates? 
Evidence presented above shows that PSA’s financial performance has been ex-
tremely poor. Which factors explain these results? For Benencia (1997), three main reasons
Figure 2.
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answer this question. First, natural calamities, crop failure or low output-price problems.
Second, mistakes in assessing the poverty level (or debt-capacity) of potential clients, pro-
viding over-sized credits. Third, unwillingness to repay incurred by more speculative
farmers who know PSA’s limitation to effectively enforce repayments. Additionally, based
on peasant reports, the frequent gaps in loan availability created a feeling of ‘bankruptcy’.
Subsequently, trust in the system was reduced and speculative motivations increased.
Moreover, the political context and contradictory State interventions in Argentina
have exacerbated defaults, as shown in two examples. First, the formal credit system (es-
pecially State banks) has been historically -also after adjustment policies- very weak in re-
covering loans. It is not a real problem for borrowers not to pay, since the system has no
sanction for those in default11. Secondly, ‘Programa Trabajar’ (working programme) -
another social fund that targets unemployed rural workers and peasants- is implemented in
tandem with PSA, providing subsidies for $200 per month during six months without re-
quirements of any productive project. As a result, many peasants might have the same re-
sponse as one of PSA’s beneficiary in the province of San Juan, who said during a field
visit in June 1999: ‘If they (Trabajar’s beneficiaries) do not pay a cent, why should I repay
my loan?’ 
Overall, problems of default in PSA may be attributed to the used credit methodol-
ogy. However, particular attention should also be given to the historical and political con-
text which shows that in Argentina subsidised credit schemes still remain (Schreiner,
2000). In this context, the ‘credit culture’ among borrowers and lenders is distorted. Farm-
ers are conditioned to expect concessions and it is difficult to determine whether the gov-
ernment really wants to improve financial performance of state-led programmes. 
5. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
This study has explored how rural financial approaches have been changing over
the past three decades, giving particular attention to the question about how credit policies
can reach the rural poor, and how they are able to improve financial performance. In the
                                                
11 For example, the Argentinean National Bank determined an ‘automatic’ rescheduling for overdue loans for
more than 150,000 clients to ‘reduce’ default rates in order to avoid the Bank’s privatisation (See Diario de
Cuyo, 12-08-1996).
20
context of structural reforms, the study focused on the case of PSA. This is a state-led pro-
gramme aimed at reducing rural poverty by providing credit, technical assistance and
training services to the peasant sector. In this study, two majors aspects of PSA have been
analysed; namely the programme (1) as social fund and (2) as a rural credit programme. 
Evidence collected in this study indicates that PSA, as a social fund, had quite ac-
ceptable results. Although many similar policies in Latin America have been assessed as
ineffective instruments to reach peasants and improve their production and technology
(Braverman & Guash, 1986:1254-5), PSA has effectively increased access to capital assets
and transferred technology to targeted peasants, avoiding leakage to the non-poor farmers.
Despite that, PSA has serious limitations in terms of resources and infrastructure to over-
come rural poverty and stop the proletarianisation trend in rural Argentina, since it only
had resources to reach about 24 per cent of the total target population.
In relation to the credit scheme, results are much more negative. The main conclu-
sion that emerges from the study indicates that PSA did not succeed in combining the wel-
fare impact with financial performance. PSA did not learn from many lessons documented
on microfinance, and, being conditioned by rural poverty and social concerns after adjust-
ment in Argentina, it adopted a subsidised credit policy that resulted in low financial per-
formance. ‘Soft’ credit conditions, an inappropriate legal framework and weak instruments
to enforcement repayment are some factors behind very low recovery rates. As a result, the
default rate is extremely high and the rotating fund absolutely unsustainable. PSA has very
limited chances to spread, and it is fully dependent on external support. PSA placed the
‘old wine’ of a credit policy of the 1960s and 1970s, in the ‘new bottle’ of a social policy
framework of the 1990s. 
Having shown the consequences of this combination, what should be done if PSA
credit policy is to be more efficient and the system made more sustainable? Recent experi-
ences provide useful positive lessons that could be learned in order to improve financial
performance without shifting the focus on the poor. Based on the analysis of PSA and the
study of innovative experiences, nine propositions are put forward as the policy implica-
tions of this study12. 
                                                
12 For key writings and lessons from rural MFIs, see Klein et al (1999), Coffey (1998), Alvarado (1996)
Christen et al. (1995), Jain (1996), Yaron (1992a/b) Otero & Rhyne (1994) and Rivas Guerra (1995).
21
First, it has to be acknowledged that the worst ‘enemy’ of any financial system is
the loan repayment default (Stearns, 1992). Default, rather than a problem of the users or
external factors like low prices or natural disasters, is a programme weakness. PSA’s pol-
icy of frequent rescheduling and, in certain cases, debt forgiveness was used to hide and
‘alleviate’ default problems, consequently undermining loan recovery and repayment dis-
cipline.
Second, PSA’s policy of repayment enforcement has to be effectively implemented
to strengthen institutional credibility. For example, in cases of intentional default, PSA
could not seize even those assets acquired with loans, due to the limitations of a non-
financial institution.
Third, a complementary strategy based on ‘dynamic incentives’ (Besley & Coate,
1995) can lead to higher repayment rates. For example, rewarding farmers with repeated
loans and increasing credit size upon satisfactory repayment; or cutting off any future
lending when loans are not paid.
Fourth, high transaction costs have a negative impact on financial performance.
Although PSA’s costs cannot be attached only to the credit service and -by definition- ag-
ricultural lending involves high costs, administrative expenditure in PSA is extremely high
in relation to the real monetary transfer to beneficiaries (figure 1). PSA could reduce costs
by simplifying its bureaucratic and slow lending procedures.
Fifth, although the group lending methodology contributes to reducing costs and
empowering social organisation, individual lending improves loan recovery. In effect, les-
sons from MFIs show that individual credits provide more flexibility in meeting the loan
demand, improve loan quality and reduce default risks (Klein et al., 1999). Taking this into
account, PSA could introduce more individualised lending terms within existing groups. In
doing so, PSA should also improve the assessment of loan repayment capacity and credit
worthiness of new beneficiaries to avoid oversized loans (but not exclude least viable
farmers).
Sixth, PSA should move from subsidised interest rates to positive interest rates if
better performance is expected. PSA´s experience shoes that low interest rates did not lead
to higher repayment, and the poorest peasants were precisely those who exhibited better
repayment records. For PSA´s case, Morduch’s approach could be appropriated. For him,
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rather than market or subsidised rates, the interest should be fixed at the level just below
rates traditionally charged by informal lenders (Morduch, 1999).
Seven, in rotating fund schemes the sense of ownership in the management in-
creases repayment. This can be facilitated by letting beneficiaries administrate funds
(Chavez, 1997). If PSA attempts to reduce default risk and administrative costs, the rotat-
ing fund should be transferred (decentralised) towards peasant organisations in each prov-
ince or region, instead of being managed by national authorities.
Eight, the more financial services satisfy the real demand of peasants, the more
they will contribute to supporting the system (Chavez, 1997). Hence, the beneficiary’s
opinions regarding the optimal ways of improving the credit scheme should be consid-
ered13. In general terms, they expect from PSA: (1) delivery of credit when demand is ex-
pressed; (2) simplicity of lending procedures; (3) flexibility in the use of loans; (4) cer-
tainty about repeated and higher loans when repayment record is good; and (5) stringent
mechanisms for those who do not repay loans. Overall, such development will increase the
trust in the system. 
Finally, it has been acknowledged that qualified staff has a positive effect on the ef-
fectiveness of credit policies. Therefore, to improve financial performance, the credit man-
agement staff has to be trained to learn from new rural credit technologies that were devel-
oped in Latin America since the late 1980s. In PSA’s case this has been insufficiently
done.
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